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1. Introductory remarks - generał rationale
for imposing product charges
on environmentally arduous goods
The possibility and purposefulness of an extensive application of eco- 
nomic Instruments for the achievement of specific targets of environ- 
mental policy ensues, first of all, from the fundamental premise that un- 
der the hard money budget constraint (which is of crucial significance to 
a market economy) such Instruments affect the costs borne by producers 
and consumers, thus encouraging them to limit environmental externali- 
ties brought about by production and consumption.
Another argument is that product charges imply widening the real 
scope of the application of the Polluter Pays Principle (as one of the main 
foundations of contemporary environmental policy) and, in particular, 
affecting consumer behavior by this principle. This is of key importance, 
sińce almost all the economic instruments of environmental protection 
are intended to address the economic behaviour of producers of environ- 
mentally arduous goods (the only significant exception is user charges). 
Thirdly, the implementation of product charges mean a wider implemen- 
tation of the distributive justice principle when using economic instru­
ments for environmental protection. Last but certainly not least, product 
charges may bring about the abatement of emission of specific pollutants
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(waste), thus contributing to a wider application of the prevention prin- 
ciple (abatement of pollution at source) in environmental policy (given 
their incentive function). This will occur, in particular, when product 
charges force consumers of environmentally harmful goods to reduce 
their consumption or to substitute them for morę environmentally sound 
ones. One cannot ignore the fact that a wide application of such an in­
strument also supply public budgets (central and local) or earmarked en- 
vironmental funds with additional financial means.
Summing up these introductory remarks, it is necessary to emphasize 
that economic instruments for environmental protection should always 
be perceived as a factor which strengthens and does not replace direct 
(legał, administrative etc.) regulation measures. However, it is worth re- 
calling here that economic instruments for environmental protection, 
given their correct design, implementation and performance, may con- 
tribute to a substantial decrease in the costs of achieving the targets set 
by State environmental policy. On the other hand, while generating rev- 
enue to earmarked environmental funds and/or various public budgets, 
the instruments in question, and different environmental charges and 
taxes in particular, generally increase the possibilities of publicly finan- 
cing environmental protection.
2. Product charges vs. generał criteria for using 
economic instruments for environmental protection
Based on the subject literaturę, as well as the respective experience of 
many Western European countries,1 the following definition of product 
charges may be formulated: Product charges are non-refundable finan­
cial burdens imposed on products which cause damage to the environ- 
ment either in production/consumption or post-production and post-con- 
sumption phase.
1 Survey of this literaturę may be found in: Czaja et al. [1996]. See also OECD [1999],
The essential features of product charges may be, in turn, summa- 
rized as follows:
1. Subjects charged: finał users of a given good (both producers and 
consumers).
2. Product charges are a kind of surcharge on the price paid by finał 
users and as such they are not a cost to producers. Therefore, product 
charges should not result in additional tax load for the latter.
3. Product charges are not a sort of „environmental fine” (penalty) or tax.
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Against this background, it must be stressed that it is freąuent prac- 
tice to consider product charges a kind of tax burden imposed on con- 
sumer or production goods which are harmful to the environment. This 
is not justified and leads to obscuring the very naturę of this specific en- 
vironmental protection instrument. Moreover, considering product 
charges as an additional tax burden may result in both decreasing the 
interest and involvement of environmental policy makers in implemen- 
ting them and in weakening the social support for this instrument.
Various economic instruments for environmental protection and natu- 
ral resource management differ with respect to methods, scope and dis- 
tributive and allocation outcomes. Such instruments aim at the internal- 
ization of environmental production and consumption externalities. 
With respect to the foundations of the environmental and natural re­
source economics, and the theory of external effects and cost-benefit 
analysis in particular, when designing product charges and other eco­
nomic instruments for environmental protection the following generał 
principle should be taken into consideration: The overall sum of identifi- 
able and estimable social benefits consisting of the reduction of welfare 
losses related to the use of a good to be covered by a given instrument 
has to be larger than its overall implementation and realization costs. 
The latter also comprise the losses in welfare linked to increased costs 
and prices (caused by the introduction of a given instrument) to be paid 
by producers and consumers (households, other firms and the govern- 
ment sector).2
2An extensive survey of the theory of external effects and cost-benefit analysis can be 
found in Fiedor [2002] Chapter III and IV.
3 For a detailed discussion of normative, as well as economic, theory of regulation see 
Kahn [1991], Yiscusi et, al. [1997] and Fiedor [2001],
2— Sustainable..
This criterion refers directly to the essential statements of so called 
normative regulation theory which, in turn, is based on neoclassical wel­
fare theory.3 According to this theory, the introduction of specific regula­
tory measures (both direct and indirect) by the state is generally justi­
fied when a certain market failure occurs. In other words, when 
allocation of scarce resources by way of the market mechanism does not 
lead to a Pareto-optimal eąuilibrium, there is a loss in the social welfare. 
From the point of view of this paper, this is the loss caused by excessive 
pollution of the natural environment. Public regulation can be, however, 
accepted only when the benefits from improving the market as an alloca­
tion mechanism, due to the application of a given regulatory measure, 
exceed the loss in welfare. Furthermore, if this loss is relatively smali, 
precaution in using public regulation instruments to improve the effi-
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ciency of the market mechanism is needed. There are at least two rea- 
sons for this. Firstly, we should always remember the fact that in the 
real world we have to freąuently deal not only with market failures, but 
also with state failures (public regulation failures). The latter simply 
means that public regulation may also lead to a loss in potential social 
welfare. Secondly, it may happen that the source of inefficiency of the 
market mechanism are not real features of the market (e.g. natural mo- 
nopolies, information imperfections etc.), but the state regulatory activi- 
ty as such. In other words, one cannot exclude the situation where state 
failures directly cause the occurrence of market failures.
It is extremely difficult to use the criterion outlined above or to di­
rectly apply the main statements of neoclassical welfare theory and nor- 
mative regulation theory in the process of designing and selecting eco- 
nomic instruments for environmental protection. This is for two reasons. 
First and foremost, there are essential difficulties concerning the Identi­
fication of the costs and benefits related to environmental protection and 
pollution. Secondly, these are connected with high costs and long dura- 
tion investigations that are necessary to estimate these costs and bene­
fits, and its monetary valorisation in particular. Therefore, when desig­
ning and implementing the instruments under consideration, such 
generał criteria should be taken into account for which the consistency 
of a given instrument with them can be easily checked on the basis re- 
search, which is of low-cost and not time-consuming. In accordance with 
the methodology which is commonly used and recommended by the 
OECD, the most important of those operational criteria are as follows 
[OECD, 1991]:
- Environmental effectiveness (potential and actual).
- Economic efficiency.
- Distributive justice.
Environmental effectiveness. The criterion of environmental effec- 
tiveness always relates to clearly defined objectives of environmental 
policy. Thus, it may consist in achieving a specific ambient concentration 
standard at a local or national scalę, or in the reduced emission of 
a given pollutant; once again, regionally/locally or nationally. By and 
large, the environmental effectiveness of economic instruments of envi- 
ronmental protection depends on the strength of their incentive function 
vis-B-vis the economic subjects (polluters) affected by them.
As far as product charges are concerned, their potentially high envi- 
ronmental effectiveness is linked to the fact that they directly influence 
a subject who pollutes the environment or consumes its resources. Se­
condly, this efficiency results from the commonness of product charges,
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which simply means that they encompass all the users of a given envi- 
ronmentally harmful good, irrespective of the place of purchase (domes- 
tic or imported good). Finally, product charges may become an important 
instrument of environmental education and thus in an indirect way con- 
tribute to environmental amelioration or a decrease in the use of natural 
resources.
Economic efficiency. Economic efficiency is usually understood as:
1. Maximization of the following ratio: environmental benefits gained 
due to implementing specific measures/activities to the costs that are 
necessary to achieve these benefits.
2. The existence of a surplus of revenues (to the budget, environmen- 
tal earmarked funds, etc.) generated by using a given economic instru­
ment over the costs of its implementation and current realization (some- 
times called the administrative efficiency).
The first of criteria listed above measures the “external efficiency” of 
a given instrumentu operational system. By analogy, the second of these 
criteria may be named “internal efficiency”. Experience related to the 
performance of product charge systems in highly developed Western 
economies show that almost all these systems meet the criterion of in­
ternal efficiency. Measuring the economic efficiency of product charge 
systems, or any other economic instruments for environmental protec- 
tion, on the basis of the external efficiency criterion encounters crucial 
difficulties in practice. With respect to the complexity of this problem, 
I shall confine myself to the following statement: If we decide to intro- 
duce a product charge on a good whose consumption brings about seri- 
ous damage or harm to the environment (e.g. minerał fertilizers) and we 
are able to roughly estimate the implementation and realization costs of 
relevant administrative and financial system, then the higher the effi­
ciency according to both the first and the second criteria, the greater the 
decrease in consumption. At a given elasticity of demand, it will depend 
on the relative (as compared with the price) ratę of product charge.
Distributive justice. All broadly understood environmental fees and 
charges influence, directly or indirectly, the prices of intermediate and 
finał goods, as well as of factors of production. This in turn brings about 
distributive effects. The latter may assume various forms and differ con- 
siderably with respect to their scope. It may be, for instance, linked to 
the level of marginal abatement costs or the elasticity of demand for 
goods, whose manufacture is affected by a given economic instrument of 
environmental protection.
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Distributive justice means, in particular, that environmental charges 
and other forms of financial burdens related to harmful environmental 
outcomes of production and consumption are of a common naturę. In 
other words, they encompass all the subjects generating such outcomes. 
Secondly, the charges concerned are commensurate with the environ- 
mental diseconomies which they are intended to address. If a product 
charge is properly designed (see the following section of this paper), then 
it fulfils this criterion a priori, because the financial burden it implies is 
directly related to the quantity and environmental arduousness of 
a good charged.
3. Specific criteria for the choice of goods 
to be covered by product charges and for 
the differentiation of product charge rates
3.1. Criteria for choice (features of goods to be covered, 
conditions favouring high environmental effectiveness 
and economic efficiency)
Given the fulfilment of generał criteria discussed above for using eco­
nomic Instruments in environmental protection and natural resource 
management, the next step should consist in defining some specific cri­
teria, i.e. criteria relating directly to product charges. Based on these cri­
teria, specific goods that are suitable for covering by such charges can be 
chosen. They should have the following features:
- Products used (consumed) in large quantities, but in a dispersed 
manner (e.g. by households).4
- Unit production or consumption does not bring about substantial 
environmental harm, but total consumption causes considerable damage 
to the environment.
- Easily identifiable products whose consumption may be easily mea- 
sured.
- Products characterized by a high price and (sometimes) high de- 
mand elasticity.
- The existence (availability) of environmentally cleaner substitutes 
with regard to the goods to be charged with product charges.
4 For goods that are used in large quantities, economically and technically morę justified 
Instruments are effluent fees (for water- and air-borne pollutants in particular). To some 
extent, product charges may be considered a substitute for effluent fees in the case of dis­
persed emission, which means the use of ecologically harmful goods in smali ąuantities.
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- The possibility of taking advantage of the administrative and finan- 
cial (tax) systems already existing to implement a given product charge 
system [OECD, 1991].
The criteria listed above should not be interpreted in such a way that 
if any specific product does not meet them, then it cannot be charged. 
These are merely the conditions whose fulfilment should lead to an ap- 
plication of product charges, which ensures both a high environmental 
effectiveness (the achievement of relevant targets set by the environ- 
mental policy) and economic efficiency. Moreover, the criteria in que- 
stion cannot be regarded as thoroughly separable ones. For instance, as- 
sume that at the present time there are no morę environmentally sound 
substitutes available for a good to be covered by the product charge. In- 
troducing this charge, we can however achieve an environmental goal 
through the expected decrease in the consumption of the product 
charged. Depending on the institutional arrangements adopted, the net 
revenue obtained from a given product charge can be devoted to finan- 
cing research activities to develop environmentally less harmful substi­
tutes which, in turn, might lead in the futurę to a further decrease in 
the consumption of the good charged.
By analogy, when a good we would like to cover by the product charge 
has a Iow price elasticity of demand, a charge can still be introduced. Fur- 
thermore, this case can even be considered advantageous from the point of 
view of the product charge income (transfer) function. On the other hand, 
a Iow price elasticity is Information for environmental policy makers that 
for the existence of a potential incentive function, the product charge 
should be established at a very high level vis-f-vis the current price of the 
good. It is also worth noticing here that a high charge plays an essentially 
educational function, because it turns attention to the importance of envi- 
ronmental problems related to the consumption of the product charged.
3.2. Criteria for defining charge rates
and their differentiation
The level of product charges, as well as their differentiation, may in 
practice be subject to a „political gamę” or regulatory dispute, whose ob- 
jective is the distribution of costs and benefits between the participants 
involved. These are, on the one hand, users, domestic producers and im- 
porters of goods to be covered by product charges. On the other hand, 
public administration bodies proposing to introduce such an economic in­
strument of environmental protection and to organize the technical and 
economic-financial systems which are necessary for its implementations 
are participants of this “gamę”. These bodies are the direct beneficiaries
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of the revenue from these systems. In this gamę, some subjects may ob- 
tain unjustified benefits, due to the Information they hołd or lobbying ac- 
tivities. Regardless of that, one can and should reąuire environmental 
regulation authorities to base their decisions on product charge rates on 
pure objective criteria (as discussed in this paper).
Environmental arduousness related criteria 
for setting the rates
General criterion: commensurability with environmental diseconomies 
caused by product use or consumption of a given good.
Specific criteria-. content of environmentally harmful substances in 
a good, amount of substances emitted/disposed of while consuming 
a unit of a given good and weight or volume of a unit of the environmen- 
tally harmful good.
Auxiliary criterion: avoidance of rates that might result in a lack of ac- 
ceptance from consumers and producers (lack of social acceptability).
Incentive and revenue raising function related criteria (bases) 
for setting rates
Ali economic instruments for environmental protection play — at least 
potentially - an incentive function, which is connected with their influ­
ence on the microeconomic calculus of economic entities being subject to 
these instruments. Simultaneously, they also play an income transfer 
function, which consists in generating revenue for public budgets, ear- 
marked environmental funds etc. From the operational point of view, 
the revenue raising (transfer) function consists in the existence of a sur- 
plus of revenue gathered relative to the overall costs of the technical-ad- 
ministrative system designed to implement and operate a given system 
of product charges. If a given product charge fulfils this function (accor- 
ding to the above understanding), then it fulfils the criterion of admini- 
strative (interna!) efficiency of the system of product charges as defined 
earlier on in this paper. This can also be interpreted in the following 
way that the product charge must be high enough to ensure the self- 
-financing of the system under consideration.
As far as the incentwe function is concerned, its actual strength de- 
pends on two factors:
- Demand and/or income elasticity.
- Availability of morę environmentally sound substitutes.
Thus, for instance, if we want to achieve a specific environmental 
target, which is the decrease in the consumption of a given good to be
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covered by the product charge, then the lower the demand elasticity the 
higher must be its ratę. Given, in turn, a constant demand elasticity, the 
larger the amount and the easier the market availability of morę envi- 
ronmentally sound substitutes for the product charged the better the 
fulfilment of this target. It is of crucial significance here to make con- 
sumers aware and convinced that those substitutes are less harmful to 
the environment and that they fulfil to a comparable extent the main 
function of the good being substituted.
Criteria for ratę increases and rebates
Basing the product charge rates on the criteria outlined above does 
not imply that these rates cannot change over time. This rather obvious 
statement reąuires, however, additional explanation from the point of 
view of product charge management system. Hence, the following crite­
ria seem to be of key significance in the process of making decisions on 
ratę increases and, on the other hand, rebates:
A. Inflationary adjustments of rates.
B. Increases in rates as resulting from striving after:
(i) Reduction in the emission of air- and waterborne pollutants and 
waste disposal.
(ii) Development of environmentally sound products.
(iii) Increase in the revenue collected enabling public authorities to 
promote the development of cleaner substitutes and/or morę envi- 
ronmentally sound “consumption technologies”.
C. Rebates:
(i) as decreases in rates, serving to encourage the manufacturers of 
goods covered by a given product charge to introduce a cleaner sub- 
stitute (applicable in cases where the implementation of a program 
to introduce a product charge has already begun and will be com- 
pleted within a time period agreed upon with the respective envi- 
ronmental agencies);
(ii) as refunds to consumers, serving to encourage them to dispose 
of goods in an environmentally sound way or other desired beha- 
viour patterns in the post-consumption phase (to be applied in 
mixed systems, i.e. product charge - deposit/refund Systems).
4. Concluding remarks
1. Product charges, as any other kind of economic regulation in envi- 
ronmental protection, cannot be considered as a substitute for direct re­
gulation in this realm. For instance, the process of the introduction of
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product charges on detergents containing phosphates should be accom- 
panied by an increasing rigidity of direct regulation, and setting morę 
and morę restrictive standards on the maximum permissible content of 
phosphates in particular. Similarly, the introduction of product charges 
on non-refundable (one-use) consumption packaging should be connected 
with the widening of the legał liability of enterprises producing and di- 
stributing goods sold in such packaging in the sphere of package collec- 
tion, re-use and recycling (as is commonly the case in EU countries and 
exists in an initial phase in Poland after a new law on product charges 
and packaging waste came into force in 2002).
2. Product charges may, like other economic instruments, enhance the 
effectiveness of direct regulation measures, as well as create flows of 
revenue that can be used for financing the necessary technical and insti- 
tutional infrastructure for the effective performance of direct regulation. 
A good example here is the system of package waste management men- 
tioned above.
3. Product charges, when adeąuately high with respect to the market 
prices of goods to be covered by them, may induce suppliers (producers, 
importers) and consumers to evade legał regulations through the illegal 
introduction into the market of goods not burdened by the charges con- 
cerned. The actual scope of such activities will depend on a specific 
cost-benefit calculus of evading the law. These costs, in turn, will be de­
pendent on the risk of uncovering such activities. It additionally justifies 
the need to develop and strengthen parallel the direct regulation system 
for goods being covered with product charges.
4. While designing product charge systems, the criteria and conditions 
which are essential to their environmental effectiveness and economic 
efficiency should always be taken into account. This refers both to the 
criteria for choosing the goods the product charges are to encompass and 
to criteria for setting the level of charges and their differentiation. If this 
is not the case, then one cannot exclude that the charges under exami- 
nation will only play merely temporary fiscal or propaganda functions 
thus contributing very little to solving or mitigating environmental prob- 
lems, which they can and should address.
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